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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-3399 
 ___________ 
 
 MAMADOU NBAYE, 








 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A097-520-789) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Grace A. Sease  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 4, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. AND GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 







 Before us is a petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) denying the Petitioner’s motion to reopen his removal proceedings.  For the 





 Mamadou Nbaye, a native and citizen of Guinea, attempted to enter the United 
States in 2005 using a stolen French passport.  He was detained and subsequently pled 
guilty to use of a fraudulent passport, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3551.  While detained, 
he applied for asylum and related relief.  He claimed he would be persecuted on account 
of his political opinion if returned to Guinea.  In support of this claim, Nbaye stated that 
he, his father, and his sister were members of the Rally of the Guinean People Party 
(“RPG”), which opposed the party of the then-president of Guinea.  JA at 346.  Nbaye 
claimed that he worked as a driver for the RPG, but quit after his father and sister were 
killed by members of the ruling party.  Id. at 351.  Shortly thereafter, he and his mother 
were beaten and he was imprisoned for ten months, until a friend paid a bribe for his 
release.  Id. at 352-53.  He went to France several months later and then traveled to the 
United States.  Id. at 353-54.  
 In his hearing before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Nbaye offered his testimony,  
his identification card and passport from Guinea, a map of Guinea, and a few reports and 
articles about conditions in the country.  JA at 311-40.  The IJ found Nbaye “simply not 
credible” based on inconsistencies she perceived in his testimony and a “less than 
candid” demeanor.  JA at 177-78.  The IJ also faulted the lack of corroborating evidence 
and did not accept Nbaye’s explanation that he had been unable to contact anyone to 
obtain corroboration.  Id.  The IJ denied relief, and the BIA affirmed in 2005.  Nbaye did 
not petition for review of the BIA’s final order of removal. 
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 Several years later, in May 2009, Nbaye filed a counseled motion to reopen, 
contending that changed circumstances in Guinea warranted reopening of his removal 
proceedings.  Nbaye cited a December 2008 military coup that overthrew the previous 
government and reports of abuses by security forces.  JA at 51.  He argued that there 
would be “escalated fighting among political groups” in Guinea and that his affiliation 
with the RPG was now an even greater reason to fear persecution, torture, and death.  Id.  
In support of his motion, Nbaye submitted a 2008 State Department Report on Human 
Rights Practices in Guinea, as well as several articles about the coup.  He also offered an 
undated letter from a friend stating that many of Nbaye’s friends had been killed and that 
his mother had fled to Senegal.  The friend warned him never to return to Guinea because 
“they” would torture and kill him.  JA at 82.  In addition to this evidence regarding 
country conditions, Nbaye also offered evidence to corroborate his previous testimony, 
including birth certificates for himself and his sister, death certificates for his sister and 
father, and a newspaper article describing their deaths and his imprisonment.  JA at 59-
80. 
  The BIA denied Nbaye’s motion, finding that he had “not demonstrated changed 
country conditions satisfying the exception” for untimely motions to reopen.  JA at 25.  
In pertinent part, the BIA concluded that the undated letter from Nbaye’s friend was 
insufficient to demonstrate worsening conditions in Guinea material to Nbaye’s claim.  
Id. at 24-25.  Acknowledging that the articles and State Department report showed a 
change in the Government of Guinea, the BIA concluded that the documents did not 
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show how the change in government would affect Nbaye “differently from the general 
population of Guinea.”  Id. at 25.  In other words, the documents did not show that 
“conditions have specifically worsened for supporters of the [RPG].”  Id.  Nbaye filed a 
timely petition for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review the order denying Nbaye’s 
motion to reopen.  In his brief, Nbaye also seeks review of an order from the  BIA 
denying his motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to reopen.  His petition for 
review, however, concerns only the BIA’s order denying his motion to reopen.  Nbaye  
has not moved to amend his petition to include the order denying reconsideration.  We 
therefore lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order denying reconsideration because 
Nbaye has not filed a petition for review of that order.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). 
 The Government contends that Nbaye has waived any challenge to the BIA’s 
order denying his motion to reopen by failing to address the order in his brief.  See Resp. 
Br. at 15.  We disagree.  Although it is “well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify 
or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal,” United 
States v. Pellulo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2002), and Nbaye does frame the issues for 
review in terms of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, he nonetheless refers to 
the “decisions” of the BIA in his argument and makes arguments that pertain to the 
substance of the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen.  See Pet. Br. at 14-16.  We 
therefore conclude that Nbaye has not waived review of the BIA’s order denying the 
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motion to reopen.  
III. 
  A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which 
the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).   Nbaye filed his motion years after the BIA issued its final 
order of removal and he does not contest its untimeliness.  Instead, Nbaye sought to 
proceed under the exception for motions based on “changed country conditions arising in 
the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and 
would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”  8 U.S.C.  
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 
 We review the BIA’s denial of Nbaye’s motion to reopen for an abuse of 
discretion and may reverse only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Shardar 
v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2007).  We consider whether Nbaye presented 
both evidence of changed country conditions and a prima facie case for asylum.  Id. at 
312.  “To establish a prima facie case for asylum, the alien must produce objective 
evidence that, when considered together with the evidence of record, shows a reasonable 
likelihood that he is entitled to relief.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 To show changed country conditions, Nbaye presented a letter from a friend, news 
articles about the coup, and a State Department Report.  The BIA determined that the 
letter is not “sufficient to demonstrate worsening conditions in Guinea that are material” 
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to Nbaye’s claim.  JA at 24-25.  The undated letter states “they have killed a lot of your 
friends, for example Mouctar, Moustapha, Kadiatou, etc.” and warns Nbaye not to return 
because “[t]hey will torture you so that you suffer before they kill you.”  JA at 82.  The 
writer does not elaborate on these dire events in the short letter and does not identify who 
“they” are.  The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the vague or 
unconfirmed claims and warning in the letter are insufficient to constitute evidence of 
changed country conditions.  Furthermore, we note that Nbaye attests that he received the 
undated letter in April 2008, many months before the December 2008 coup.  JA at 134.  
Therefore, the letter describes events that occurred before the coup and cannot constitute 
evidence of changed conditions due to the coup. 
 With regard to the news articles and report, the BIA acknowledged that they 
“show that there has been a change in the government of Guinea since [Nbaye’s] hearing, 
but “they do not demonstrate how the December 2008 coup will affect [him] differently 
from the general population of Guinea.”  JA at 25.  The BIA then held that Nbaye failed 
to show changed country conditions.  Id.  This holding is somewhat confusing, given the 
BIA’s apparent recognition that the background material showed a change of conditions 
in Guinea. It appears to us that the Board’s rationale more aptly supports a conclusion 
that Nbaye failed to make a prima facie case that he is eligible for asylum in light of the 
changed country conditions.  See Shardar, 503 F.3d at 312 (explaining that whether a 
movant has presented new evidence of changed country conditions and whether the 
evidence as a whole makes out a prima facie case for asylum are distinct issues). 
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 Nonetheless, it is apparent that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by determining 
that the background material Nbaye submitted is insufficient to warrant reopening the 
removal proceedings.  The BIA concluded that the material does “not demonstrate that 
conditions have specifically worsened for supporters of the [RPG.]”  JA at 25.  A review 
of the background material supports that conclusion.  Although the State Department 
report and news articles describe turbulent conditions in Guinea following the coup, none 
of the material suggests that the new regime is targeting RPG members for persecution.  
Nbaye has thus failed to make the showing of a “a particularized threat of persecution” 
that is required of asylum applicants.  Shardar, 503 F.3d at 316. 
 In his brief, Nbaye argues that he fears the Guinean military because they killed 
his family and imprisoned him and, therefore, the fact that the military now controls 
Guinea provides a “compelling basis” to reopen his removal proceedings.  Pet. Br. at 16.  
This attempt to recharacterize his claim for asylum is of no avail.  Eligibility for asylum 
must be based on a showing of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  Nbaye’s asylum claim is clearly 
based on “political opinion,” i.e., his membership in the RPG.  JA at 123, 133.  And, as 
explained above, the evidence he submitted in support of his motion to reopen does not 
show that the military coup in Guinea represents a particularized threat to RPG members. 
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
